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Abstract
The probabilistic guarded-command language pGCL [15] contains both demonic and probabilistic
nondeterminism, which makes it suitable for reasoning about distributed random algorithms [14].
Proofs are based on weakest precondition semantics, using an underlying logic of real- (rather than
Boolean-) valued functions.
We present a mechanization of the quantitative logic for pGCL [16] using the HOL theorem
prover [4], including a proof that all pGCL commands satisfy the new condition sublinearity, the
quantitative generalization of conjunctivity for standard GCL [1].
The mechanized theory also supports the creation of an automatic proof tool which takes as input
an annotated pGCL program and its partial correctness speciﬁcation, and derives from that a
suﬃcient set of veriﬁcation conditions. This is employed to verify the partial correctness of the
probabilistic voting stage in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm [10].
Keywords: pGCL, formal veriﬁcation, probabilistic programs
1 Introduction
The probabilistic guarded command language pGCL extends Dijkstra’s orig-
inal guarded-command language GCL [1] to include probabilistic choice. The
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extension allows the speciﬁcation of quantitative properties of programs, such
as “the chance that the program delivers the correct output is at least 0.95.”
Demonic nondeterminism, identiﬁed by Dijkstra as the key notion underly-
ing abstraction and reﬁnement, is retained. Within pGCL the combination
of probability and nondeterminism allows the realistic treatment of imprecise
behaviour, avoiding the problem that exact probabilities cannot be imple-
mented. For instance a program that behaves correctly (indicated by an ok
result) with probability at least 0.95 can be described in pGCL as
ok 0.95⊕ (¬ok  ok) .
Here 0.95⊕ repsesents a probabilistic choice of (0.95, 0.05) between its left,right
arguments respectively; the  on the other hand represents demonic choice,
thought of as a selection made arbitrarily. This combination of probabilistic
and demonic choices means that programs can exhibit a range of behaviours,
rather than exactly one: above, the “demon” can aﬀect the outcome only 5%
of the time, and then might behave correctly in any case. The most that can
be said is that the probability that the output will be ok lies in the interval
between 95% and 100%. 1
We describe the quantitative properties of probabilistic programs using
pGCL’s quantitative program logic [16]. Programs are interpreted as real -
rather than Boolean-valued functions of the state, and it is this generality
which admits sound judgements concerning probabilistic and demonic choices,
as above.
In this paper we present the following signiﬁcant novelties:
• a mechanization of pGCL programs (with weakest-precondition semantics)
in higher-order logic, using the HOL4 theorem prover;
• an automatic proof tool that takes as input annotated pGCL programs, and
calculates veriﬁcation conditions suﬃcient for their partial correctness; and
• the application of this proof tool to the formal veriﬁcation of the probabilis-
tic voting scheme in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm [10].
A mechanized theory is one with a machine-readable logical formalization;
and there are two main beneﬁts to having a mechanized theory for pGCL. The
ﬁrst is the existence of a logical formalization at all: if the theory is formalized
in a consistent logic by making deﬁnitions and then deriving consequences
of them (instead of simply asserting axioms), then the theory has a strong
assurance of consistency. The HOL4 theorem prover provides tool support
1 Another approach to the semantics of probabilistic programs [8] leaves out demonic non-
determinism and instead takes these probability intervals as primitive.
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for this “deﬁnitional approach,” and as a result our pGCL theories are as
consistent as the base higher-order logic.
The second beneﬁt of mechanization is machine-readabilty: we can use
the mechanized pGCL theories to support the creation of automatic proof
tools that use weakest-precondition semantics for reasoning. For example,
verifying pGCL programs typically involves much numerical calculation, and
this can be formally carried out by rewriting with relevant theorems about real
numbers. Since HOL4 is a theorem prover in the LCF family, it provides a full
programming language (ML) for the user to write such tools [2]. Consistency
is enforced by the logical kernel, a small module that is solely empowered to
create objects of type theorem, which it does by applying the inference rules
of higher-order logic.
We created many small tools to speed up mechanization and program ver-
iﬁcation, including the rewriting described above for real numbers. We also
implemented a tool which takes as input an annotated program C, precon-
dition P and postcondition Q, and generates veriﬁcation conditions that are
suﬃcient for partial correctness (the Hoare triple {P}C{Q}). It proves as
many of these veriﬁcation conditions as it can, simpliﬁes the remainder and
then returns them to the user as subgoals to be proved interactively.
In Sec. 2 we present the formalization of pGCL in higher-order logic, il-
lustrated with a simple worked example: the Monty Hall game. In Sec. 3 we
describe the proof tool for generating veriﬁcation conditions; and in Sec. 4
we apply the theory and tools to the veriﬁcation of the probabilistic voting
scheme in Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm.
Higher-order logic types include the Booleans B, reals R, and integers Z.
The notation t : τ means that the term t has type τ . Applying the function
f to an argument x is expressed by juxtaposition f x, and multiplication uses
an explicit operator × instead of juxtaposition. We use the notation x ≡ t
to mean x is deﬁned to be t. Finally, we use the variable e to range over
real-valued expressions denoting random variables over the state, t to range
over transformers, s to range over states and c to range over commands.
2 Formalized pGCL
Fix a (possibly inﬁnite) state space α and let α be the probability subdistri-
butions over α, that is functions f :α → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈α f x ≤ 1 .
We can then view a probabilistic command c as a relation α × α → B
between initial states and probability subdistributions over ﬁnal states. This
is a relational (or operational) semantics: a program evolves from a deﬁnite
J. Hurd et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 95–111 97
initial state yet produces not a deﬁnite ﬁnal state, but rather a probability
distribution over ﬁnal states that reﬂects the probabilistic branching in its
execution. Demonic branching is indicated by relating the initial state to
more than one ﬁnal distribution. The following example shows both why we
need relations instead of functions, and probability sub-distributions.
Example 2.1 Consider the following probabilistic program
Ex1 ≡ (n: = n+1  n: = n+2) 1/2⊕ Abort ,
where  denotes demonic choice, 1/2⊕ denotes symmetric probabilistic choice
and Abort means “go into an inﬁnite loop” (see Section 2.2 for precise deﬁni-
tions). The state space of Ex1 is Z (the possible values of the program variable
n); and applying the above semantics to Ex1 gives a relation that relates initial
state n = 0 to these two subdistributions over ﬁnal states:
(· · · , −1 → 0.0, 0 → 0.0, 1 → 0.5, 2 → 0.0, 3 → 0.0, 4 → 0.0, · · ·)
(· · · , −1 → 0.0, 0 → 0.0, 1 → 0.0, 2 → 0.5, 3 → 0.0, 4 → 0.0, · · ·) 
The logic for pGCL has this relational semantics as a model: it is a quanti-
tative weakest-precondition formulation originally due to Kozen [9], but with
demonic choice added [16]. A program’s ﬁnal distributions are described by
giving their expected values with respect to arbitrary random variables which
we think of as “reward functions” that quantify the beneﬁt of successful ter-
mination. The eﬀect of this approach is to simplify the resulting proof system,
without conceding expressivity [14].
Given a probabilistic command c, ﬁx a reward function Q:α → R+ from
ﬁnal states to non-negative real numbers. Given an initial state x we can
compute the average reward from executing c repeatedly by taking the expected
value of random variable Q with respect to c’s output distribution. If c is also
demonic, we average over all distributions separately and take the least result
(because adversaries act to minimize expected rewards). Lastly, if c does not
terminate the convention is to reward with zero.
Using this procedure we can calculate the expected reward for each initial
state x, and thus end up with a reward function P :α → R+ from initial states
to non-negative real numbers: the weakest precondition of Q.
Example 2.2 Consider again the probabilistic program Ex1, and suppose the
reward function Q on ﬁnal states is deﬁned as
Qn ≡ “ 2 if n is odd, and 3 if n is even. ”
What is the expected reward function P on an initial state x? Half the time
the program will loop and the reward will be zero. The remaining half of the
time the least expected value over the demon’s choice will be due to whichever
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assignment delivers an odd result, because the reward is only 2 for this, as
opposed to 3 for the even outcome. Thus the expected reward is
P x ≡ 1/2× 0 + 1/2× 2 ,
that is one, for every initial state x. 
Expected-reward functions such as P and reward functions such as Q are
simply called expectations. In pGCL we view a probabilistic command c as an
expectation transformer, mapping expectations on ﬁnal states to expectations
on the initial states. It is an elementary fact of probability theory that if the
post-expectation is derived from a predicate — a characteristic function that
rewards one for states satisfying the predicate and zero otherwise — then the
pre-expectation gives the greatest guaranteed probability that the program
terminates in a state satisfying the predicate.
We spend the remainder of this section presenting a formalization of this
weakest precondition-style semantics of probabilistic programs.
2.1 Formalizing expectation transformers
In pGCL, expectations are functions from a state space α to the extended
positive real numbers R+ ≡ [0,+∞]. The real numbers have previously
been mechanized in several diﬀerent theorem provers (for an example in Ergo
see [18]), so we have a solid basis on which to construct extended positive
real numbers. Accordingly, we ﬁrst created a new higher-order logic type
posreal to capture this domain, and lifted the usual arithmetic operations to
it. Naturally we had to make some choices about how the lifted arithmetic
operations should behave on ∞, and the following identities summarize our
decisions:
1/0 =∞ 1/∞ = 0 ∀x. ∞+ x =∞
∀x. x =∞⇒∞− x =∞ ∀x. x =∞⇒ x−∞ = 0
∀x. 0× x = 0 ∀x. x = 0 ⇒∞× x =∞ .
Both addition and multiplication are deﬁned to be commutative, so the
above rules tell us that ∀x. x × 0 = 0, for example. Also, division is deﬁned
in terms of multiplication and reciprocal, so from the above we can infer that
∞/∞ = 0. In fact, the only operation not covered by the above rules is
∞−∞, which we deliberately leave unspeciﬁed. 2
To support our later development we deﬁne min and max operations on
posreal, and a useful shorthand to enforce one-boundedness: [x]≤1 ≡ min x 1.
We also prove a collection of theorems that can be used as rewrites to
perform numerical calculations on elements of posreal, reducing the burden on
the user in interactive proof.
2 In higher-order logic every function must be total, so ∞−∞ must be some element x of
posreal, but there is no theorem that gives any information about x.
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Example 2.3 The posreal calculations
 (1/3− 1/5)× 6 = 4/5
and  ∞− 53 =∞
can be automatically carried out by the HOL4 simpliﬁer. 
Now we have deﬁned the type of positive real numbers, we focus our at-
tention on the type
(α)expect ≡ α → posreal ,
of expectations on the state space α. Note that α is a type variable, able
to be instantiated to any higher-order logic type, and therefore the theorems
that we prove about expectations do not assume any properties of the state
space. 3
We deﬁne several operations on expectations, which are just pointwise
liftings of the corresponding operations on positive reals:
Zero ≡ λs. 0
Infty ≡ λs. ∞
e1  e2 ≡ ∀s. e1 s ≤ e2 s
Min e1 e2 ≡ λs. min (e1 s) (e2 s)
Max e1 e2 ≡ λs. max (e1 s) (e2 s)
Cond b e1 e2 ≡ λs. if b s then e1 s else e2 s
Lin p e1 e2 ≡ λs. let x ← [p s]≤1 in x× e1 s + (1− x)× e2 s .
The type (α)expect forms a complete lattice, with Min and Max being
the meet and join operators, and Zero and Infty being the bottom and top
elements. Whereas the Zero expectation assigns every state a value of zero,
the Infty expectation assigns every state a value of ∞.
Finally, the Lin operation constructs the linear interpolation between two
expectations, and Cond switches between two expectations according to a
predicate on the state space.
In pGCL, the semantics of a probabilistic program is an expectation trans-
former mapping postconditions on ﬁnal states to weakest preconditions on
initial states. Expectation transformers thus have higher-order logic type
(α)transformer ≡ (α)expect→ (α)expect .
To reason about expectation transformers, we borrow a few standard con-
cepts from lattice theory, in particular the existence of least and greatest ﬁxed
points of monotonic transformers, which we refer to respectively as expect lfp t
and expect gfp t.
2.2 Formalizing the weakest-precondition semantics
Next we deﬁne the pGCL semantics of a simple programming language. For
concreteness, we begin by deﬁning a state space state ≡ string → Z repre-
3 In particular, the state space might be inﬁnite.
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senting a map from variable names to integer values. The following deﬁnition
creates a new state from an old state by making a variable assignment of f s
to v:
assign v f s ≡ λw. if w = v then f s else s w
Next, we deﬁne a new higher-order datatype for pGCL commands:
command ≡ Abort
| Skip
| Assign of string × (state→ Z)
| Seq of command× command
| Demon of command× command
| Prob of (state→ posreal)× command× command
| While of (state→ B)× command .
The Abort command represents non-termination of the program; in a technical
sense it is “the worst possible program.” The Demon command uses demonic
choice to decide which of the two argument commands to execute, and the
Prob command uses probabilistic choice. Since the probability argument of
Prob is a function state → posreal, the choice probability is explicitly allowed
to depend on the state.
When writing commands, we enhance the readability with the following
syntactic sugar:
v: = f ≡ Assign v f
c1 ; c2 ≡ Seq c1 c2
c1  c2 ≡ Demon c1 c2
c1 p⊕ c2 ≡ Prob (λs. p) c1 c2
If b c1 c2 ≡ Prob (λs. if b s then 1 else 0) c1 c2
v: = {e1, . . . , en} ≡ v: = e1  · · ·  v: = en
v: = 〈e1, · · · , en〉 ≡ v: = e1 1/n⊕ v: = 〈e2, . . . , en〉
b1 → c1 | · · · | bn → cn ≡(
Abort if none of the bi holds (on the current state)
i∈I ci where I ≡ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ bi holds} .
In addition, we routinely suppress mention of the state in expressions and
conditions, writing for example v: = n + 1 instead of v: = λs. s n + 1.
We now deﬁne the weakest precondition semantic operator wp, which is a
higher-order logic function of type command → (state)transformer and maps
commands to their semantic meaning as expectation transformers:
 (wp Abort = λe. Zero)
∧ (wp Skip = λe. e)
∧ (wp (Assign v f) = λe, s. e (assign v f s)
∧ (wp (Seq c1 c2) = λe. wp c1 (wp c2 e))
∧ (wp (Demon c1 c2) = λe. Min (wp c1 e) (wp c2 e))
∧ (wp (Prob p c1 c2) = λe. Lin p (wp c1 e) (wp c2 e))
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∧ (wp (While b c) = λe. expect lfp (λe′. Cond b (wp c e′) e)) .
Example 2.4 In this example the desired ﬁnal state is one in which the
variables i and j have the same value, and so we use the postcondition
post ≡ if i = j then 1 else 0 .
First consider the program
pd ≡ i: = 〈0, 1〉 ; j: = {0, 1} .
The intuitive reading of pd is that the variable i is ﬁrst set to either 0 or 1
by tossing a fair coin, and then the demon sets variable j to either 0 or 1.
With this interpretation, it is no surprise that we can never beat the demon,
and indeed we can prove that in the weakest precondition every initial state
is mapped to zero:
 wp pd post = Zero .
Next consider the program
dp ≡ j: = {0, 1} ; i: = 〈0, 1〉 ,
which does the assignments the other way around. First the demon must set
variable j, and then variable i is set using the fair coin. In this case we can
prove
 wp dp post = λs. 1/2 ,
which corresponds to our intuition that the demon does not know the outcome
of the fair coin before it is tossed, and therefore can be beaten half the time
on average.
2.3 Healthiness conditions
For standard GCL, Dijkstra introduced several “healthiness conditions” that
characterise exactly the predicate transformers that correspond formally to an
equivalent operational (relational) semantics of programs [1]; the conditions
are used to derive sound proof rules for veriﬁcation. Likewise there is a cor-
respondence between the expectation-transformer semantics of probabilistic
programs and the operational interpretation of probabilistic programs — in
fact an expectation transformer is healthy if it is feasible, up continuous and
sublinear [16], where up continuous is a property of lattice theory and
feasible t ≡ t Zero = Zero
scaling t ≡ ∀e, x. t (λs. x× e s) = λs. x× t e s
subadditive t ≡ ∀e1, e2. t (λs. e1 s + e2 s)  λs. t e1 s + t e2 s
subtractive t ≡ ∀e, x. c =∞⇒ λs. t e s− x  t (λs. e s− x)
sublinear t ≡ scaling t ∧ subadditive t ∧ subtractive t
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Feasibility is an intuitive property, corresponding to Dijkstra’s Law of the
Excluded Miracle: if the value of all ﬁnal states is zero, then so must be the
value of all the initial states. Sublinearity in pGCL is the generalization of the
conjunctivity healthiness condition in standard GCL, and is in fact equivalent
to the single formula
sublinear t ≡
∀ e1, e2, x1, x2, x.
(λs. x1 × t e1 s + x2 × t e2 s− x)  t (λs. x1 × e1 s + x2 × e2 s− x)
Our present formalization does not include the proofs that connect ex-
pectation transformers with the relational semantics (which was ﬁrst demon-
strated by Morgan et. al. [16]). Instead we simply deﬁne a predicate
healthy t ≡ feasible t ∧ up continuous t ∧ sublinear t
and restrict our attention to healthy transformers. The properties monotonic,
scaling, linear, subtractive are all logical consequences of healthy, as we check
in the theorem prover.
The main theorem of our formalization looks deceptively simple:
 ∀c. healthy (wp c) .
It states that applying the weakest precondition semantic operator wp to any
command yields a healthy transformer.
Our direct proof is a structural induction on the command, and required
800 lines of HOL4 proof script for the main proof. (Dijkstra similarly used
structural induction for the corresponding GCL proof.) The hardest part was
proving sublinearity of while loops; for that we needed several lemmas, such
as the monotonicity of expect lfp and that subtraction subdistributes through
healthy transformers.
However the importance of healthiness conditions cannot be overstated:
for instance, properties like these are what we use to deduce the simplifying
rules for the veriﬁcation calculator described below.
2.4 The Monty Hall game
An example is provided by the infamous Monty Hall game, where the role of
the demon is played by the game show host. 4 There are three curtains and
the contestant hopes to win a prize by guessing the curtain where it is hidden.
The game begins with the demon choosing a prize curtain pc behind which to
4 Monty Hall was host of the game show Let’s Make a Deal from 1963 to 1976; ironically this
game show was notable for requiring absolutely no skill or intelligence from its contestants.
J. Hurd et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 95–111 103
hide the prize. Next the contestant chooses a curtain cc uniformly at random.
The demon then chooses an alternative curtain ac that is not equal to either of
pc and cc, and opens it. At this point the contestant may either stick with his
original choice of curtain, or switch to the remaining closed curtain. Should
the contestant switch?
We code up the Monty Hall contestant with the following deﬁnition:
contestant switch ≡
pc: = {1, 2, 3} ;
cc: = 〈1, 2, 3〉 ;
pc = 1 ∧ cc = 1 → ac: = 1
| pc = 2 ∧ cc = 2 → ac: = 2
| pc = 3 ∧ cc = 3 → ac: = 3 ;
if ¬switch then Skip else
cc: = (if cc = 1 ∧ ac = 1 then 1 else if cc = 2 ∧ ac = 2 then 2 else 3)
The left hand side of the deﬁnition includes switch as a parameter of the
contestant; this is used in the program on the right hand side to determine
whether to switch curtain in the last step. The postcondition is the desired
goal of the contestant, i.e.,
win ≡ if cc = pc then 1 else 0 .
This example is small enough that we can verify it directly in HOL4 simply
by rewriting away all the syntactic sugar, expanding the deﬁnition of wp and
carrying out the numerical calculations. This has the eﬀect of pushing the
postcondition back to the start of the program, something that is not trivial
to do by hand because the formulae become quite large. After 22 seconds
and 250,536 primitive inferences in the logical kernel, the veriﬁcation succeeds
with the following theorem:
 wp (contestant switch) win = λs. if switch then 2/3 else 1/3 .
In other words, by switching the contestant is twice as likely to win the prize.
3 A veriﬁcation-condition generator
In general, programs are shown to have desirable properties by proving lower
bounds — for example a program Prog can be shown to behave correctly with
probability at least 0.95 by proving the inequality
 (λs. 0.95)  wp Prog (if ok then 1 else 0) ,
where the post-expectation encodes the characteristic function of the set of
states in which some Boolean ok holds. Of course if a stronger guarantee
is required (a 0.99 level of conﬁdence for example) then a stronger theorem
would be required to establish it. In this section we show how to mechanize
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the proof of such lower bounds; in fact we concentrate on a generalisation
of the weakest liberal precondition semantics, a useful weakening of weakest
precondition semantics. 5
3.1 Weakest-liberal-precondition semantics
The weakest liberal precondition operator wlp is the partial correctness ana-
logue of wp. Focussing on wlp and partial correctness greatly simpliﬁes formal
veriﬁcation of looping programs, since the wp least ﬁxed-point semantics are
“the wrong way around” for proving lower bounds on preconditions.
In fact, the usual technique for proving total correctness for loops in pGCL
is ﬁrst to prove partial correctness, and then to show that wp and wlp agree
on the while loop — this amounts to proving that the loop terminates with
probability 1. This is the pGCL analogue of the well-known rule
total correctness = partial correctness + proof of termination ,
and has been proved elsewhere for pGCL [13]. Moreover simple techniques
based on program variants have also been derived. However, for the remainder
of this paper we will be solely interested in partial correctness, and so questions
of termination will not concern us.
For partial correctness, if a program does not terminate then it satisﬁes
every postcondition. Since the only places where a program may diverge
are the Abort and While commands, the weakest-liberal-precondition semantic
operator wlp diﬀers from wp only on those two commands: they have semantics
respectively
wlp Abort ≡ λe. Infty
and wlp (While b c) ≡ λe. expect gfp (λe′. Cond b (wlp c e′) e) .
The full HOL formalisation is based on the partial correctness theory for
pGCL [13].
3.2 wlp veriﬁcation conditions
In this section we assume that we have a pGCL command c and a postcondition
q, and we wish to derive a lower bound on the weakest liberal precondition.
If we think of this as the ﬁrst-order query P  wlp c q, then we can use the
following theorems together with a Prolog interpreter to solve for the variable
5 In fact for terminating programs there is no weakening.
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P .
 Infty  wlp Abort Q
 Q  wlp Skip Q
 (Q ◦ assign V F )  wlp (Assign V F ) Q
 R  wlp C2 Q ∧ P  wlp C1 R ⇒ P  wlp (Seq C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Min P1 P2  wlp (Demon C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Lin P P1 P2  wlp (Prob P C1 C2) Q
 P1  wlp C1 Q ∧ P2  wlp C2 Q ⇒ Cond B P1 P2  wlp (If B C1 C2) Q
The advantage of propagating conditions backward (implemented here with
a Prolog interpreter) is that unnecessary annotations can be avoided. For
example, consider the sequence wlp (Seq c1 c2) q. There is no need for an
annotation between the two commands, because the Prolog interpreter uses
the rules to solve for a lower bound r on wlp c2 q, then solves for a lower bound
p on wlp c1 r, and then returns p as a lower bound on the whole command
wlp (Seq c1 c2) q.
However, annotations are required to deploy the following theorem about
while loops:
 ∀P,Q, b, c. P  Cond b (wlp c P ) Q ⇒ P  wlp (While b c) Q .
To insert annotations, we deﬁne an assertion command that simply ignores
the formula given as its ﬁrst argument: thus Assert p c ≡ c . This is the
precise rule we give to the Prolog interpreter:
 R  wlp c P ∧ P  Cond b R Q ⇒ P  wlp (Assert P (While b c)) Q
It is therefore left to the user to provide a useful loop invariant P in the Assert
around the while loop. Note that the Prolog tactic will succeed on the ﬁrst
subgoal, deriving a lower bound for the body of the while loop, but the second
subgoal will fail because there are no applicable rules. In our tactic failed
subgoals do not initiate backtracking, but are instead turned into veriﬁcation
conditions. Therefore in this way each while loop in the program will generate
one veriﬁcation condition, in this case that the supplied P is in fact a correct
invariant for establishing Q. Nested while loops work in exactly the same
way: the invariant for the outer loop will be propagated backwards through
the body, and when it meets the inner while loop a veriﬁcation condition will
be generated.
The full wlp tactic works as follows:
(i) Take as input a goal of the form p  wlp c q.
(ii) Expand any syntactic sugar in c.
(iii) Create the query X  wlp c q and pass to the Prolog interpreter.
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(iv) The result will be a theorem

∧
1≤i≤n
Vi ⇒ r  wlp c q ,
where the Vi are veriﬁcation conditions.
(v) Apply transitivity of  to reduce the initial goal to the subgoals p  r
and r  wlp c q.
(vi) Use the theorem returned by Prolog to reduce the subgoal r  wlp c q to
the subgoals V1, . . . , Vn.
(vii) Expand all the subgoals with the deﬁnitions of , Min, Lin and Cond.
(viii) Try to prove all the subgoals by simplifying them and carrying out any
numerical calculations.
(ix) Return all unproved subgoals to the user, to prove interactively.
Returning to the example of the Monty Hall game, we can apply the wlp
tactic to prove the following partial correctness theorem completely automat-
ically:
 (λs. if switch then 2/3 else 1/3)  wlp (contestant switch) win .
Since there are no while loops in the contestant program, there were no veri-
ﬁcation conditions, and the only non-trivial subgoal was the p  r generated
in Step v of the tactic. However, this was proved automatically by the simpli-
ﬁcation and calculation in Step viii, and so no subgoals were returned to the
user.
This automatic veriﬁcation of the Monty Hall game is obviously much less
eﬀort than the interactive proof version described in Section 2.4 which took
18 lines of HOL4 proof script, but the automatic version of the theorem is
weaker: it only shows partial correctness.
4 Example: Rabin’s mutual-exclusion algorithm
Suppose N processors are concurrently executing, and from time to time some
of them need to access a critical section of code. Rabin’s mutual-exclusion al-
gorithm uses a probabilistic voting scheme to elect a unique “leader processor”
that is permitted to enter the critical section [10].
The idea behind the voting scheme is beautifully simple: each processor
tosses a fair coin until the ﬁrst head is shown, 6 and the processor that required
the largest number of tosses wins the election.
6 In other words, each processor picks an integer from a Geometric( 12 ) distribution.
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In our veriﬁcation, we do not model i processors concurrently executing
the above voting scheme, but rather the equivalent formulation of that system
used by Rabin [op. cit.]:
(i) Initialize i with the number of processors competing for exclusive access
to the critical section.
(ii) If i = 1 then we have a unique winner: return Success.
(iii) If i = 0 then the election has failed: return Failure.
(iv) Toss the coins: since each toss of a fair coin produces a head with prob-
ability 1
2
, each processor retires with that probability. We reduce i by
eliminating all these processors, since certainly none of them won the
election.
(v) Return to Step (ii).
The following pGCL program implements this algorithm:
rabin ≡ While (1 < i) (
n: = i ;
While (0 < n)
(d: = 〈0, 1〉 ; i: = i− d ; n: = n− 1)
)
The desired postcondition, that there was a unique winner, is
post ≡ if i = 1 then 1 else 0 .
A surprising fact about this voting scheme is that the probability of its success
is independent of the number of processors. To prove that, we need to be able
to show
pre  wlp rabin post ,(1)
where pre ≡ (if i = 1 then 1 else if 1 < i then 2/3 else 0), in which the 2/3
does not depend on i.
Recall the interpretation of a pre-condition with respect to a given post-
condition. The expression on the right at (1), evaluated at an initial state s,
gives the probability that the postcondition will be established (namely that
there is a unique winner). This must be at least the expression on the left,
which is at least 2/3 for all initial states except i = 0 (when the satisfaction
of the postcondition would be impossible in any case).
As rabin contains two While loops the invariant rule must be used twice.
Thus two loop invariants are needed, one for the inner, and one for the outer
loop, and the most challenging part of the veriﬁcation turned out to be ﬁnding
them (of course). The correct invariant for the outer loop is simply pre above,
J. Hurd et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 95–111108
but for the inner loop we used
if 0 ≤ n ≤ i then (2/3)× invar1 i n + invar2 i n else 0 ,
where
invar1 i n ≡ 1− (if i = n then (n + 1)/2n else if i = n + 1 then 1/2n else 0)
invar2 i n ≡ if i = n then n/2n else if i = n + 1 then 1/2n else 0
Translating very roughly into English: invar1 corresponds to the probability
that the inner loop terminates with i > 1; and invar2 to the probability that
the inner loop terminates with i = 1. Therefore the probability p that the
outer loop will terminate with i = 1 satisﬁes p = p× invar1 + invar2, and we
are proving that the voting algorithm works with p = 2/3.
To deploy the wlp tactic, an equivalent annotated version of the program is
required, constructed by using Assert to annotate rabin with the above invari-
ants. Next the wlp tactic is applied to the produced (one as usual, plus two
veriﬁcation conditions generated by the while loops). The wlp tactic proves
one of these automatically, and simpliﬁes the other two. We apply some cus-
tom simpliﬁcations, and are left with three non-trivial subgoals which depend
on properties of exponentials. These are despatched by 58 lines of proof script,
completing the veriﬁcation of the speciﬁcation (1) of the behaviour of rabin.
5 Conclusions and related work
We have shown how to formalize in higher-order logic the theory of pGCL,
a language for reasoning about both demonic and probabilistic choice in a
common framework; we have implemented a veriﬁcation-condition generator
to assist with formally proving the partial correctness of programs, and we
have demonstrated it on some small examples.
This work demonstrates the beneﬁts of mechanizing a theory of program
semantics using a theorem prover. In particular, the fact that the theorem
prover was interactive ﬁtted very nicely with the veriﬁcation-condition genera-
tor: if subgoals appeared that could not be proved automatically, then instead
of causing a failure they could be passed on to the user for manual proof.
Moreover we took advantage of the LCF design of HOL4 , which preserves
the consistency of user-deﬁned tactics: the veriﬁcation-condition generator is
highly complex, but nevertheless any theorems that it creates have a high
assurance of soundness.
Future work will focus on formalizing the correspondence between wp and
wlp semantics, with the aim of implementing a total-correctness veriﬁcation
generator. This will additionally require proofs of termination, and it will
be interesting to provide tool support for probabilistic variants and other
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termination arguments.
The ﬁrst author has mechanized a semantics of probabilistic programs in
HOL4 [7], but this language did not support demonic choice. The third author
has recently extended the B tool (a proof assistant for program reﬁnement)
with a probabilistic choice construct [6].
Probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [11] eﬀectively calculate weak-
est preconditions for ﬁnite-state machines incorporating both probabilistic and
demonic choice, and can also deal with loops without needing helpful anno-
tations. On the other hand, the limited expressivity of the logic means that
sometimes it cannot model algorithms in their full generality, but instead must
restrict to a ﬁxed number of processors.
Harrison has previously mechanized Dijkstra’s weakest precondition se-
mantics for standard GCL in the HOL Light theorem prover [5], and Nipkow
has produced a comprehensive mechanization of Hoare logics in the Isabelle
theorem prover [17]. Finally, there have been several veriﬁcation condition
generators for while languages created for use with the HOL theorem prover,
beginning with Gordon’s in 1989 [3].
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